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Abstract
We show that a transfer targeting a minority of the population is sustained by majority
voting, however small the minority targeted, when the probability to receive the transfer is
decreasing and concave in income. We apply our framework to the French social housing
program and obtain that empirically observed departures from these assumptions are
small enough that a majority of French voters should support a positive size of this
program. We also provide a su¢ cient condition on this probability function under which
more targeting results in a lower equilibrium size of the transfer system.
Keywords: Paradox of redistribution, A program for the poor is a poor program,
majority voting, social housing in France.
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1 Introduction
Social transfers targeted on the basis of income represent a sizeable component of public
spending in all democratic countries. For instance, in 2007, almost 11% of public spend-
ing in OECD countries took the form of means-tested programs (Adema et al., 2011).
Although targeting benets towards those who need them most seems like an obvious
proposition (Sen, 1992), the political economy literature has stressed the existence of
a paradox of redistribution, where increased targeting towards the poor hurts them
because the erosion of popular support generated by this targeting results in a smaller
program. Gelbach and Pritchett (2002) present several cases where more for the poor
means less for the poorand show that given a choice of uniform and targeted transfers,
the targeted regime may actually decrease the poorswelfare.1
An extreme case of this paradox obtains when too much targeting results in the absence
of majority support for the program. From a political economy perspective, it is indeed
di¢ cult to explain why a majority of voters would support transfers targeted towards
a minority. De Donder and Hindriks (1998) study a pure redistribution model where a
monetary benet, nanced by a proportional income tax paid by all, is targeted towards
agents with an income lower than a threshold level. They obtain that the transfer needs
to be targeted towards signicantly more than one half of the voting population to be
supported by a majority of voters.2 Moene and Wallerstein (2001) introduce an insurance
motive for the transfer, beyond pure redistribution, by assuming that future income is
uncertain, but they obtain a similar result: in their numerical simulations, the political
support for a targeted system disappears when less than two-thirds of the population
receive the transfer.
In this short paper, we propose a simple way to reconcile minority targeting and major-
ity voting, by assuming that agents see the attribution of the benet as a random process.
For instance, it is well known (Cornia and Stewart (1995), Swaminathan andMisra (2001))
that purely means-tested programs make errors (of inclusion and of exclusion) that add
a random component to the attribution process. More generally, attribution procedures
are often complex and based on several criteria beyond income. If the way these criteria
are weighted is unclear, or if agents do not know the joint distribution of these criteria in
the population, they then consider the attribution process as a random event.
We build a simple model where agents di¤er in their exogenous income and pay a
proportional income tax which nances a lump sum transfer served to a fraction  of the
population. Each individual faces a probability p of receiving the transfer, which depends
on her income y and on .3 Agents vote over the size of the program, measured by the
tax rate which nances it. We rst show that, if p is increasing in , and decreasing and
concave in y, then there is a unique majority voting equilibrium with a strictly positive
size of the program, however small the fraction of agents targeted. We then give a simple
1Korpi and Palme (1998) have been very inuential in establishing this paradox. More recently, Marx
et al. (2013) contend that this paradox no longer holds as a robust empirical generalisation.
2Cardak et al. (2013) study a similar model where agents vote rst over the size of the program
and then over the extent of means-testing. They obtain that the majority chosen means-testing level is
determined by the median income voter, so that minority targeting can not be an equilibrium.
3So, unlike Moene and Wallerstein (2001), we assume uncertainty as to the attribution of the benet
rather than as to future pre-tax income.
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and intuitive condition on p (that its elasticity to  for the median income individual is
at least equal to one) which guarantees that an increase in targeting (i.e., a decrease in )
results in a lower majority voting equilibrium size of the program (a necessary ingredient
for the paradox of redistribution to occur). Finally, we apply our framework to a
French social program targeted towards a minoritysocial housing. Using survey data,
we show that empirically observed departures from our assumptions that p is decreasing
and concave in income are small enough that a majority of French voters should support
a positive size of this social housing program.
2 The model
A continuum of agents of mass one di¤er in exogenous income y, which is distributed
over the interval [0; ymax] according to the (non degenerated) cdf F , with mean E(y) = 
and median ymed, and ymed < . Each agent faces a probability of receiving a transfer
described by a continuous function p(y; ) 2 [0; 1] depending on her income y and on the
(exogenous) fraction  2 [0; 1] of the population receiving the transfer.4 By the law of
large numbers, we then have Z ymax
0
p(y; )dF (y) = :
We make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 For all y 2 [0; ymax], the probability function p(y; ) is (i) strictly in-
creasing in , and (ii) strictly decreasing and (iii) concave in y.
Assumption 1 (i) requires that an increase in the overall fraction of the population
receiving the transfer translates into an increase in the probability of receiving the transfer
for all individuals. Assumption 1 (ii) formalizes that the transfer is targeted towards lower
income agents, in the sense that higher income individuals have a lower probability of
receiving the transfer.
Denote by  the income level such that p(; ) = . We obtain:
Lemma 1 For any  2 (0; 1) and under Assumptions 1 (ii) and (iii),  exists and is
such that   .
Proof. By Assumption 1 (iii), Jensens inequality implies that E(p(y; )) =   p().
By Assumption 1 (ii), we obtain that   , and that it is unique.
The threshold  divides the population into two groups: people endowed with an
income lower than ; who receive the transfer with a probability higher than ; and
people with an income higher than , who receive the transfer with a probability lower
than : A corollary to this Lemma is that both the median and mean income individuals
have a larger-than-average probability of receiving the transfer: p(ymed; ) > p(; )  .
4We model a monetary transfer rather than the public provision of a private good for simplicity, but
the reasoning developed in this paper applies to the latter case as well.
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We move to the political determination of the transfer size as a function of the fraction
 of agents receiving the transfer.
All individuals have the same preferences represented by an increasing and concave
function u(:) of consumption. They all pay a proportional tax t on their income that
is used to nance the lump sum transfer received with probability p(y; ). The indirect
utility function is then5
U(y; t; ) = (1  p)u(cu) + pu(cl);
where
cu = (1  t)y
is the consumption level if unlucky (no transfer), while
cl = (1  t)y + t

is the consumption level if lucky, with the amount of the transfer obtained from the
government budget constraint together with the law of large numbers.
We look at the individualsmost-preferred value of t for a given exogenous value of .
The FOC with respect to t is
@U(y; t; )
@t
= pu0(cl)
h

  y
i
  (1  p)u0(cu)y; (1)
where the rst term measures the marginal benet from increasing t (a larger consump-
tion level in case the transfer is received, provided that y is not so large that the agent
contributes more than the lump sum transfer received) while the second term reects its
marginal cost (a lower consumption level if unlucky). From Lemma 1, we have that
ymed <   :
Proposition 1 makes use of the following assumption.6
Assumption 2 The coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is lower than one:
 xu
00(x)
u0(x)
< 1:
5We simplify notation by not reporting the arguments of p unless there is a risk of confusion.
6Karagyozova and P. Siegelman (2012) survey the empirical literature on relative risk aversion. They
report very large ranges for empirically plausible individual values of the coe¢ cient of relative risk aver-
sion: from [0.35, 1] for Hansen and Singleton (1983) to [0.029, 680] for Halek and Eisenhauer (2001). Holt
and Laury (2002) estimate that two thirds of respondents in their study have a value of the coe¢ cient
between 0.15 and 0.93. Assumption 2 then seems reasonable.
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Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the majority chosen (or Condorcet winning)
tax level, denoted by tV , is strictly positive, for all  > 0.
Proof. We denote by t(y) individual ys most-preferred tax level. It is easy to see from
the FOC (1) that the SOC holds, so that individual preferences are single-peaked in t
and we can apply the median voter theorem to obtain that tV = med(t(y)). We then
show that dt(y)=dy < 0 under Assumption 2, so that med(t(y)) = t(ymed). Applying
the implicit function theorem to equation (1), we obtain that
@t(y)
@y
s
=
@2U(y; t; )
@t@y
=



@p
@y
u0(cl) + pu00(cl)(1  t)

 y@p
@y
[u0(cl)  u0(cu)]
 p [u0(cl) + y(1  t)u00(cl)]
 (1  p) [u0(cu) + y(1  t)u00(cu)]
< 0 since u0(cl)+y(1 t)u00(cl) > 0 and u0(cu)+y(1 t)u00(cu) > 0 follow from Assumption
2.
Finally, we obtain that t()  0, since
@U(; t; )
@t
= u0(cl)
p

  [pu0(cl) + (1  p)u0(cu)]  0
when t = 0 since p()   (since    by Lemma 1, together with Assumption 1 (ii)),
which in turn implies that t(ymed) > 0 (since ymed < ).
The proof of this result consists in two stages: rst, we obtain that the most-preferred
value of t decreases with y (so that the median income agent is decisive), and then we
show that this agent favors a positive value of the tax rate. Higher income agents favor
less taxation because of both a lower marginal benet of taxation (because of both a
lower probability of receiving the transfer and a lower marginal utility in case the transfer
is received) and a higher marginal cost of taxation (because this cost is proportional to
income, and because marginal utility does not decrease too fast under Assumption 2). As
for why the median income agent prefers a positive tax rate, it is due to the inequality
ymed <   , which guarantees that even the richer-than-median average income favors
a scheme for which he has a larger-than-average probability of receiving the transfer. This
analysis is valid whatever the value of  > 0.7
Proposition 1 then shows that it is possible to support under majority voting a scheme
that targets a transfer to a minority of the population, however small this minority, when
the probability of receiving the transfer is decreasing and concave in income and when
the relative risk aversion is not too large.
7The introduction of distortionary taxation, for instance in the form of endogenous labor supply, would
not change these results, provided that the distortions when t = 0 are not too large.
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We now tackle the impact of the proportion of the population receiving the transfer
() on the majority chosen value of the tax rate, tV . This impact is far from obvious,
since more targeting (i.e., a decrease in ) decreases the probability to receive the transfer
while increasing its value (for a given tax rate). Our second proposition makes use of the
following assumption:
Assumption 3 The elasticity of the probability of receiving the transfer to the targeting
level is at least equal to one for the median income individual:
@p(ymed; )
@
 p(ymed; )

:
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, more targeting (i.e., a lower exogenous
) results in a lower majority voting equilibrium size of the system:
@tV
@
> 0:
Proof. By Proposition 1, tV = t(ymed). Applying the implicit function theorem to the
FOC (1) when y = ymed, we obtain that
@tV
@
=
@t(ymed)
@
s
=
@2U(ymed; t; )
@t@
=
@p(ymed; )
@
u0(cl)


+p(ymed; )
h
 u00(cl)t 2

  u0(cl) 2
i
 y

@p(ymed; )
@
(u0(cl)  u0(cu))  p(ymed; )u00(cl)t 2 

= u0(cl)



@p(ymed; )
@
  p(ymed; )


+p(ymed; )u
00(cl)t 2
h
ymed   

i
 y@p(ymed; )
@
(u0(cl)  u0(cu))
> 0 under Assumption 3.
The intuition for Proposition 3 is that the decisive median income agent most-prefers a
smaller transfer program (a necessary condition for the paradox of redistribution to occur)
when more targeting decreases her own probability to receive the transfer su¢ ciently fast.
3 Empirical application - social housing in France
We now check whether probabilistic targeting may explain the political sustainability
of a specic targeted aid system, namely social housing in France. A minority of the
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population in France8 benets from social housing, which is heavily subsidized.9 Demand
for social housing exceeds supply, and there is uncertainty as to whether a candidate will
obtain social housing (within a reasonable delay),10 so that the access to social housing
can be seen as a probabilistic event. In order to estimate this probability function, we
make use of the Enquête Logementrun by the French statistical Institute (INSEE) in
1996. This survey contains extensive information on a French representative sample of
42,694 households, including whether they occupy subsidized social housing (Habitation
à Loyer Modéré, or HLM) and the total yearly income of the household. We obtain
that 8,780 out of the 42,694 households do occupy a HLM in the 2006 database, which
means that  = 0:206.11 We construct the probability of obtaining social housing as a
function of income by computing, for each income decile,12 the proportion of households
in this decile who currently benet from social housing. We report our results on Figure
1. Figure 2 then ts a curve that goes through the ten (income, proportion) pairs, using
the middle income amount inside each decile.
Figure 2 shows that the assumption that the function p is decreasing and concave holds
for most but not all income levels. More precisely, the tted curve is concave except for
the bottom three deciles of the income distribution, and is decreasing in income except
for the top two deciles.13 Since the assumptions that p is decreasing and concave are
su¢ cient but not necessary for the majority support of a targeted system (Proposition 1),
we now look at whether the departures from these assumptions remain consistent with
the existence of this program.
Insert Figures 1 and 2 around here
The marginal utility with respect to t, given by (1), when t = 0, is
@U(y; t; )
@t
jt=0 = u0(y)
h
p(y; )


  y
i
: (2)
Since utility is concave over t, whatever the shape of the function p, a positive marginal
utility with respect to t at t = 0 implies that the most-preferred value of t is positive.
8In 2011, 5.192 million out of the 28.2 million (main) residences in France consisted of social housing.
This represents 44% of the rental market, and slightly below 20% of the total housing market for main
residences.
9According to Trannoy and Wasmer (2013), social housing represents the equivalent of a transfer (the
gap between market and actual rent) varying from 500e to 1,500e per household per year, depending on
the characteristics of the house(hold).
10A recent report sponsored by the o¢ ce of the Prime Minister (France Stratégie, 2014) mentions (on
p. 48) the clarication of the conditions under which social housing is attributedas one of the main
challenges facing housing policies in France within the next 10 years.
11This corresponds to a slight over-representation of social housing in the sample compared to the
overall French situation.
12The income measure we use is total household income in 2006 (including labor income, capital income
and social transfers) per unit of consumption i.e., using the OECD equivalence scale to correct for the
household size.
13We know the income and residency status of households in 2006, but not when rst entering social
housing. Selecting in the database the households who have moved recently to social housing results in
a subsample that is too small to be exploited.
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Even though p is rst increasing in y, we obtain that the expression between square
brackets in (2) is monotone decreasing in y and becomes nil at the 57.7 percentile of the
income distribution. Our model then predicts that 57.7% of the french population should
support a positive size of the public housing system, given the way housing is allocated as
a function of income. Moreover, since our calibrated function p in Figure 2 is concave over
y for all income levels who most-prefer a positive value of t, we obtain that the median
income voter is decisive when voting over the size of the system (for given ).14 Finally,
observe that the shape of p departs su¢ ciently from the assumptions made in Lemma 1
that  is actually very slightly lower than , with F () = 0:6 while F () = 0:61. Indeed,
the average income voter should be against the public housing scheme as implemented in
2006 in France.
4 Conclusion
The message of this short paper is that minority targeting can be supported by a majority
of voters when the probability of receiving the benet is decreasing and concave in income,
however small the minority targeted. Departures from these assumptions are small enough
in the case of social housing in France in 2006 that we indeed nd majority support for
this program benetting roughly 20% of the population. Finally, making the probability
that the median income voter receives the transfer su¢ ciently responsive to the fraction of
the population targeted induces her to favor a smaller system when targeting is increased,
a necessary condition for the paradox of redistribution to occur.
Our model can be extended in several directions. First, it can be adapted to the case
where the probability of receiving the benet is increasing with income (for instance, in the
case of public provision of elitistgoods, such as opera or higher education). Second, it
can be enriched to investigate the e¤ects of income inequality on the majoritarian support
for targeted programs. Finally, voters could also vote over the degree of targeting of the
system, as in De Donder and Hindriks (1998) or Cardak et al. (2013). These extensions
belong to our research agenda.
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